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A TEMPERING OF JUDICIAL LEGISLATION: GLOBUS REVISITED
Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969)
Defendant Law Research Service, Inc. (LRS), made a Regulation A
offering of 100,000 shares of its stock.' Defendant Blair & Co.
underwrote this issue. The offering circular prominently featured an
attractive contract between LRS and the Sperry Rand Corporation. It
failed, however, to state that serious disputes had arisen regarding the
contract, making its future value doubtful. Alleging that the failure to
disclose the doubtful value of the contract made the offering circular
misleading, thirteen purchasers of the stock brought suit to recover
damages. The jury found that LRS, its president, E.C. Hoppenfeld,
and Blair had violated § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 2
and § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19343 because of the
omission from the offering circular of information necessary to make
it not misleading. It accordingly awarded compensatory damages to all
I. Regulation A of the 1933 Securities Act permits an issuer to make a small public offering
without filing the complex registration statement and prospectus normally required by law.
Nonetheless, the issuer must still submit to the SEC an offering circular containing basic
information about the stock and its issuer. After review by the SEC, the offering circular is
distributed to prospective purchasers of the stock. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.263 (1969).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1964). § 17 (a) reads:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the use of
any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or
by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material
fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964). Section 10(b) reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange-
(b) to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered
on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1969), is virtually identical to § 17(a), except that the
statutory provision applies only to the conduct of sellers, while the rule governs the conduct of
both buyers and sellers.
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plaintiffs. The jury also found that Hoppenfeld and Blair actually knew
of the omission; it therefore awarded punitive damages against them
for the § 17(a) violation.
Blair had crossclaimed against LRS, its president, and its secretary-
treasurer under an indemnity clause of the underwriting agreement.
This clause provided that LRS would indemnify the underwriter for
any loss arising because of the omission from the offering circular of
a material fact necessary to make the statements not misleading, unless
Blair was guilty of willful misfeasance, bad faith or gross negligence
in the performance of its duties or reckless disregard of its obligations
and duties under the agreement.' The jury found Blair entitled to
indemnity under this agreement.
The district court set aside the verdict on the crossclaims, but upheld
the punitive and compensatory damage awards.' Defendents appealed.
Held: when an underwriter's misconduct in iiolation of the Securities
Act of 1933 involves more than ordinary negligence, it will (I) not be
permitted to enforce an indemnity agreement with the issuer; and (2)
punitve damages cannot be recovered under § 17(a).'
INDEMNITY
The court began by asserting that its holding was limited to
situations in which the underwriter was guilty of more than ordinary
negligence. It then noted that even at common law one could not insure
himself against his own reckless or intentional conduct, and that under
the terms of the indemnity agreement itself Blair could probably not
recover from LRS. Nonetheless, it chose to place its holding, like that
of the lower court, on the grounds of public policy. First, the court
noted that § 11 made underwriters-jointly liable with directors, experts
and other signers of a registration statement for any misstatement.
Secondly, the court pointed out that the SEC views indemnification of
directors and controlling persons as against the policy of the 1933 act.
Because § 11 indicates that underwriters should be treated like
controlling persons, and because indemnification of controlling persons
is contrary to public policy, the court reasoned that indemnification of
underwriters should not be allowed. To support its syllogism, the court
4. The indemnity clause is reprinted in the opinion of the Court of Appeals. Globus v. Law
Research Service, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1287 (2d Cir. 1969),
5. Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 188, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
6. Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc.. 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969).
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pointed out that the purpose of the 1933 Act was to secure full and
fair disclosure for the investor. One of the means of implementing this
purpose was to impose a duty of reasonable investigation upon
underwriters. To allow indemnification for more than ordinarily
negligent breaches of their statutory duty would invite laxity in these
investigations. This would frustrate the Act's objective of full
disclosure through multiple independent investigations. 7
The traditional rule for testing the validity of contracts by which a
defendant attempted to limit his liability for negligence was articulated
in New York Central R.R. v. Lockwood.' In Lockwood the Supreme
Court held that exculpation contracts are valid unless (1) the purpose
of imposing liability was to assure compliance with a legal duty and
allowing exculpation would frustrate that purpose, and (2) allowing
exculpation would deprive an injured party of compensation? Though
Lockwood involved an exculpation agreement in which one party
agreed to hold the other harmless for a breach of duty toward the
first,1' its rule was subsequently applied to indemnity agreements," in
which the first party agreed to hold the other harmless for breaches of
a duty toward a third. 2
New York Central R.R. v. Lockwood was the only case the Globus
court cited in arguing that Blair's indemnification should be held
invalid because it would discourage thorough investigation by an
underwriter and therefore violate public policy." Indemnity contracts
challenged under the Lockwood rationale, however, normally have been
upheld unless they denied the victim compensation. 4
7. Id. at 1287-89.
8. 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 357 (1873).
9. Id. at 381-84.
10. At common law, contracts exculpating one from the consequences of his negligence were
generally valid; however, a bargain for exemption from liability for the consequences of a willful
breach of duty was illegal. See RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRACrS §§ 574-75 (1932); Annot., 175
A.L.R. 8, 12-20 (1948).
1I. See Note, 72 YALE L.J. 406, 409 (1962) and cases collected v. Arnold, 32 Tex. Civ. App.
272, 12. See Annot., 175 A.L.R. 8, 20-38 (1948); cf. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 572
(1932).
13. Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1288-89 (2d Cir. 1969).
14. See Note, 72 YALE L.J. 406, 409 (1962). Of course, if the validity of indemnity agreements
is to be tested solely by the second Lockwood condition they will always be found valid because
indemnification, by definition, arises only after the injured party has received compensation.
Therefore, occasional cases are found in which indemnity agreements have not been enforced
because they were inconsistent with the first principle in Lockwood. See Otis Elevator Co. v.
Maryland Cas. Co., 95 Colo. 99, 33 P.2d-974 (1934); Employers' Liability Assur. Corp. v. Post
& McCord, Inc., 286 N.Y. 254, 36 N.E.2d 135 (1941); Page v. Turner Constr. Co., 262 App.
Vol. 1970: 567]
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The reason behind allowing such indemnification contracts to stand
has been the courts' unwillingness to acknowledge that the in terrorem
effect of potential liability might substantially affect the liklihood of
negligent conduct.'5 The Globus court specifically noted that it was
dealing with situations in which the person seeking indemnity was more
than ordinarily negligent. Indeed, the court states that it is dealing with
a situation in which the jury "necessarily found . ..that Blair had
actual knowledge of the material misstatements." Two rationales
were available to the Globus court to bring the invalidation rule of
Lockwood into play. If the Globus holding is limited to situations of
reckless or intentional conduct the deterent value of potential liability
would be obvious: the defendant would have knowledge that his actions
were exposing him to potential liability. On the other hand, the Globus
decision may mean that previous refusals to admit the deterent effect
of liability are superseded by the Congressional policy of using liability
for an enforcement mechanism in dealing with the securities industry.
The second of these alternatives seems more consistent with the Globus
court's citation of general policy." If this is the basis for the court's
holding, however, it seems as consistant to deny compensation for
"ordinarily" negligent wrongs as those "more than ordinarily"
negligent.
Compensation is provided for under the Securities Act as a means
of allowing private individuals to enforce compliance with the
disclosure provisions. 8 It is not intended primarily as a means of
compensating an injury. Courts implying liability have also admitted
its utility in enforcing the Act's provisions. 9 If indemnification is
permitted, even for negligent acts, the Act will be stripped of one of
its deliberately built-in enforcement mechanisms. Further, by admitting
to the utility of civil liability as an enforcement mechanism, the court
is simply acceding to a long line of cases implying liability for
Securities Act violations.
Div. 858, 28 N.Y.S.2d 164 (1941); St. Louis & S.W. Ry. v. Arnold, 32 Tex, Civ. App. 272, 74
S.W. 819 (1903); Johnson's Adm'r v. Richmond & D.R.R., 86 Va. 975, 11 S.E. 829 (1890).
15. See Note, 72 YALE L.J. 406,409 n.30 (1962).
16. Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1288 (2d Cir. 1969).
17. Id. at 1288, 1289.
18. See Statement of Purpose of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1964);
Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171 (1933). The Globus court
admits that "the Securities Act is more concerned with prevention than cure." Globus v. Law
Research Service, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1289 (2d Cir. 1969).
19. See J.[. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
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The S EC's differentiation between underwriters and controlling
persons and directors in the notes following rule 4602 is usually cited
as an argument against the position taken by the Globus court,2 i.e.
that the same public policy that disfavors indemnification of directors
is applicable to underwriters. Making a virtue of adversity, the Globus
court, by its reference to § 11, which treats underwriters identically
with controlling persons and experts for the purpose of joint liability, 2
utilizes the SEC's policy against indemnification of directors and
controlling persons to support its conclusion. It ignores the SEC's
rather pointed omission of underwriters from the list of persons whose
indemnification will deny acceleration under rule 460.23
There are, however, valid reasons for ignoring any distinctions
between underwriters and directors. The basis for the SEC's policy is
probably the common law rule denying enforcement of agreements to
indemnify directors for negligent mismanagement. 24 At common law,
an exculpation agreement, and by extension an indemnity agreement,
was unenforceable if it defeated the public policy and denied
compensation to the injured party.2 The rule of non-indemnification of
directors follows from the non-exculpation rule because
indemnification of directors not only thwarts the in terrorem effect of
a possible recovery, but denies compensation to stockholders.
Stockholders would have the value of their investment decreased by
indemnification payments made from the corporate treasury.
If the policy against indemnification of directors expressed in the
notes following rule 460 is based on a denial of compensation to
shareholders, it is of questionable validity. If a purchaser sells his stock
before he recovers judgment against the directors, he cannot be denied
compensation. Even if he has not sold, because of wide stock
ownership, the effect of indemnification probably is insignificant
compared with his recovery. Moreover, the value of an investment is
determined by the market, and market value is not directly controlled
20. Note (a), 17 C.F.R. 230.460 (1969), indicates the SEC's view that indemnification of
directors, officers and controlling persons of the issuer violates public policy. Note (b), 17 C.F.R.
230.460 (1969), indicates that indemnification of underwriters violates public policy if the
underwriter is also a director, officer, or controlling person.
2 1. See Note, 72 YALE L.J. 406,410 (1962).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1964).
23. 17 C.F.R. 230.460, notes (a) & (b) (1969).
24. Note, 72 YALE L.J. 406,411 n. 39 (1962).
25. New York Central R.R. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 357, 377-80 (1873); Note, 72
YALE L J 406,408-09 (1962).
Vol. 1970: 567]
Washington University Open Scholarship
98 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1970: 567
by cash in the treasury. Denial of compensation does not provide an
adequate basis for distinguishing between directors and underwriters.,
Nor does public policy provide any basis for such a distinction.
Because the effect of indemnity is to shift liability to the indemnitor
for all statements made by him, the vigilance of others verifying the
correctness of the statement is diminished. It should be noted also that
while underwriters have an active duty to investigate,"1 controlling
persons have none.8 It would be incongruous to allow indemnification
of an underwriter who has breached his affirmative duty while denying
it to a controlling person.
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
In deciding whether to award punitive damages under Section 17(a),
the Globus court looked to the potential role of damages in the Act's
general enforcement scheme. The scheme's primary objective is the
deterrence of violations, and the court recognized that the availability
of punitive damages would add to the Act's in terrorem effect. The
court held, however, that the Act's existing remedial weapons
satisfactorily deter violations and, therefore, that punitive damages are
not necessary and should not be awarded. The court buttressed this
conclusion by noting that awarding punitive damages might excessively
punish, and perhaps financially ruin, a violator because the courts
could not effectively control his total liability in the numerous and
separate suits which a single securities violation would precipitate.
Also, because punitive damages are not available under the Exchange
Act of 1934,31 the court reasoned that awarding them under the
Securities Act would create an unreasonable dichotomy between
protection available to buyers and to sellers of securities.3'
26. Especially in light of state laws prescribing or permitting indemnification of directors and
;he availability of insurance to cover such liability. See Kroll, Some Reflections on
Indemnification Provisions and S.E.C. Liability in Light of BARC1RIs and GLOBUS, 24 Bus.
LAW. 681, 685 (1969).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3) (1964).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1964).
29. The court noted that there are conflicting general rules about the appropriateness of
awarding punitive damages when a statute is silent as to their award. However, after briefly
reviewing these rules, the court rejected them as a basis for deciding whether to allow the punitive
damages award to stand. Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276. 1284 (2d Cir.
1969).
30. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 28(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1964), has been held to
preclude the award of punitive damages in suits brought under that Act. See Green v. Wolf Corp.,
406 F.2d 291, 302-03 (2d Cir. 1968).
31. See notes 18-22. infra, and accompanying text.
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Conflict exists as to whether punitive damages should be awarded in
private causes of action based on federal statutes which do not
specifically provide for them.3 2 Section 17(a) does not specifically
provide for actual or punitive damages,33 but under the rationale of J.I.
Case v. Borak,u courts can imply such remedies if they are necessary
to effect the purposes of the statute. The purpose of the Securities Act
is to deter fraudulent sales of securities.3 5 Thus, the Globus court was
correct in considering whether punitive damages were necessary to
achieve effective deterrence as the determinative question.
A. Adequacy of Existing Sanctions
The Globus court adopted the position that existing sanctions
available under section 17(a) pose an adequate deterrence to fraudulent
conduct. As the court noted, violators are subject to criminal36 and
administrative37 sanctions, and the consequent tarnishment of their
good name. However, these sanctions are only effective if the potential
violator fears discovery. Unfortunately, the Securities and Exchange
Commission is overworked and lacks sufficient funds to effectively
police the Act. Admittedly, private enforcement of the Act is essential
to the discovery of violations.s
32. Some courts have held that punitive damages may be awarded only if expressly provided
by Congress. See UMW v. Patton, 211 F.2d 742 (4th Cir. 1954); Burris v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 224 F. Supp. 277 (W.D.N.C. 1963). Other courts have expressly or impliedly relied
on federal common law in awarding punitive damages under a statute which does not specifically
provide for them. See, e.g., Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965); Wills v. Trans World
Airlines, 200 F. Supp. 360 (S.D. Cal. 1961). Reported cases in which punitive damages have been
sought under § 17(a) have been few. Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836 (E.D.
Va. 1968), denied punitive damages, holding that they would add little deterrent effect to the
threat of compensatory damages and the desire to protect one's reputation. On the other hand,
Nagel v. Prescott & Co., 36 F.R.D. 445 (N.D. Ohio 1964), held that a court might award punitive
damags in a suit under the 1933 Act because it, unlike the 1934 Act, did not limit recovery to
real damages. In Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968), an action
under both § 17(a) and Rule l0b-5, the court in dictum said that since § 28(a) of the Exchange
Act applied only to suits expressly authorized by that act, punitive damages might be allowed
under either § 17(a) or Rule lOb-5.
33. Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933,43 YALE L. J. 171 (1933).
34. J.l. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
35. R JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION, CASES AND MATERIALS 66 (2d ed.
1968).
36. A "wilful" violator of any section of the Securities Act is subject to a $5,000 fine, or 5
years in prison, or both. Securities Act of 1933 § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1964).
37. The Securities and Exchange Commission has the power to suspend or expel violators of
the securities acts or suspend trading in a specific stock. Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc.,
418 F.2d 1276, 1285 (2d Cir. 1969).
38. Private enforcement of the Securities Act is not specifically provided, but most courts have
Vol. 1970: 567]
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The Globus court admitted that the availability of punitive damages
would provide greater incentive for private enforcement, but held them
unnecessary. First, the court said that because private actions already
produce large recoveries, there is sufficient incentive for private
enforcement. However, the court's unsupported assertion is
questionable: recoveries will be large only if the plaintiff's actual
damages are large. To achieve effective private enforcement of the Act,
small investors must have an incentive to sue.
Next, the court argued that the existence of class actions3'
counteracts any reluctance of a small investor to sue. However, because
class action under the new federal rule is relatively new,"0 it is uncertain
how effective it will be as an incentive to the small investor. It is clear
already, though, to pursue a class action a plaintiff must successfully
negotiate a procedural maze, 4' and it is doubtful whether the return of
a relatively small amount of actual damages will give the small investor
sufficient incentive to attempt so perilous and potentially expensive a
course. But, with the addition of puntive damages to his recovery, the
small investor certainly would be more willing to attempt it.
An alternative to the class action is making the award-eroding costs
of litigation and attorney's fees available to the successful plaintiff as
part of his compensatory damages. Certainly, this would make it more
financially feasible for the small investor to sue. However, judicial
inclusion of attorney's fees and court costs is unlikely. First, courts
would be loathe to include costs which have never been included in the
definition of compensatory damages, and second, sections 1 (e) and
12(2) of the Securities Act 42 impliedly excluded them from
compensatory damages.
It is submitted that the Globus court incorrectly concluded that
punitive damages were unnecessary to achieve effective enforfement of
the Securities Act. If the small investor is to have sufficient incentive
to police the Act and, consequently, if sellers are to be effectively
deterred from acting fraudulently, punitive damages are essential.
held that such a cause of action is implied. See 3.1. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Dack v.
Shanman, 227 F. Supp. 26 (S.DN.Y. 1964); Thiele v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
39. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
40. New Rule 23 became effective in 1967.
41. See Bernfield, Class Actions and Federal Securities Laws, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 96 (1969);
Comment, Adequate Representation, Notice and the New Class Action Rule: Effectuating
Remedies Provided By The Securities Laws, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 889 (1968).
42. Securities Act of 1933, §§ I1(e), 12(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(e), 771(2) (1964).
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B. Potentially A wesome Injuries
Against what it considered a marginal deterrent effect, the Globus
court weighed the potentially awesome injuries which might result if
punitive damages were allowed in a private cause of action under
section 17(a). The court argued that making punitive damages available
to every purchaser (each a possible plaintiff), could financially ruin the
defendant, punishing him beyond his fault. 3
Punitive damages are awarded according to the heinousness of a
defendant's conduct. The greater the number of people whom the
defendant knows he will injure by his conduct, the more heinous is that
conduct. Thus, a defendant should be assessed large punitive damages
if he knowingly acts in a manner which will harm many people; he is
not being punished beyond his fault. If a court feels large punitive
damages may threaten a defendant's financial security, it could instruct
the jury to award damages in relation to his financial resources,
avoiding the spectre of bankruptcy.
The Globus court argued further that because the amount of possible
litigation resulting from a single fraudulent act was unascertainable, a
court could not practically limit the total punitive damages. This
argument is premised on the assumption that the first determination
of punitive damages is not binding in subsequent litigations brought by
other purchasers against the same defendant. The court's argument
loses its effectiveness if the first plaintiff to sue is forced to bring a class
action, since a judgment on puntive damages here will bind all possible
purchasers, unless they are specifically excluded." If this solution is
adopted, a punitive damage fund can be established, with a time limit
for purchasers to submit their request for participation. Each
requesting purchaser would receive a share of the fund equal to the
percentage his shares bear to the total number of shares purchased.
Alternatively, if the class action is not employed, each court can
instruct the jury to award the plaintiffs in that action only punitive
damages which bear a relation to each plaintiff's actual damages, and
not to award the total punitive damages appropriate for the defendant's
conduct. Thus, all possible plaintiffs, wherever and whenever they sue,
are awarded only an aliquot portion of the total punitive damages
appropriate for the defendant's conduct, so that the defendant is not
threatened with financial ruin.45
43. Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1285 (2d Cir. 1969).
44. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
45. In considering the possible overkill effect of punitive damages, the Globus court cited
Vol. 1970: 5671
Washington University Open Scholarship
102 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1970: 567
C. Unreasonable Dichotomy with the 1934 Act
Finally, the Globus court argued that allowing punitive damages
under the Securities Act (applicable to buyers only) when they are not
available under the Exchange Act (applicable to sellers and buyers),
would produce an undesireable dichotomy between the treatment of
buyers and sellers violating the established attitude that the two Acts
should be read in pari materia. This argument is based on section 28(a)
which limits every person who maintains a suit under any provision of
the Exchange Act to recovery of only his actual damages." However,
section 28(a) has been held to apply only to suits expressly authorized
by the Exchange Act.47 Because the private enforcement of Rule lOb-5
of the Exchange Act4 is an implied cause of action, not expressly
authorized, section 28(a) does not necessarily prohibit an award of
punitive damages to an aggrieved seller." This argument is quite
realistic in light of the judiciary's proven desire to protect the investor
by any means necessary, whether specifically authorized by statute or
not. 0 If the courts recognize the necessity of punitive damages in the
enforcement scheme of both the Securities and the Exchange Acts, they
would have little difficulty achieving equal treatment of buyers and
sellers.
Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967) as a case in which punitive damages
were denied for conduct which injured many people. That case, however, did not hold, contrary
to the implication in Globus, that the possibility of overkill was reason enough to deny punitive
damages. It merely held that, if the number of potential plaintiffs and total damages are very
great, a court, in determining the sufficiency of evidence to support a verdict upon which punitive
damages could be predicated, should subject the proof to careful scrutiny.
46. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 28(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1964).
47. deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 302 F. Supp. 647 (D. Colo. 1969); Hecht v. Harris,
Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 445 (N.D. Cal. 1968). But see Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d
291 (2d Cir. 1968).
48. See note 3, supra.
49. See note 19, sypra.
50. J.l. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
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